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Abstract
To effectively tackle the security threats towards the Internet of things, we pro-
pose a SOM-based DDoS defense mechanism using software-defined networking
(SDN) in this paper. The main idea of the mechanism is to deploy a SDN-based
gateway to protect the device services in the Internet of things. The gateway
provides DDoS defense mechanism based on SOM neural network. By means of
SOM-based DDoS defense mechanism, the gateway can effectively identify the
malicious sensing devices in the IoT, and automatically block those malicious
devices after detecting them, so that it can effectively enforce the security and
robustness of the system when it is under DDoS attacks. In order to validate the
feasibility and effectiveness of the mechanism, we leverage POX controller and
Mininet emulator to implement an experimental system, and further implement
the aforementioned security enforcement mechanisms with Python. The final
experimental results illustrate that the mechanism is truly effective under the
different test scenarios.
Keywords: Internet of things, SDN, access control, SOM neural network.
1. Introduction
. We summarize the security threats of the Internet of things as the follows: (1)
There are a large number of different types of sensing devices in the Internet
of things, such as temperature sensors, infrared sensors or cameras. Normally,
these sensing devices have very limited computing abilities, and can only use
narrow-band communication protocols (such as Bluetooth, RFID, WiFi or Zig-
Bee) to send their collected data to the edge servers or intelligent terminals near
with sensing devices [1]. We always call these resource-constrained sensing de-
vices as weak sensing devices [1]. Due to their constrained computing abilities,
it is nearly impossible to deploy complex security authentication mechanisms
in weak sensing devices, such as private key authentication, verification code
authentication or access control mechanisms. Therefore, how to effectively iden-
tify and manage massive weak sensing devices is a major problem for Internet
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of things now. (2) Sensing devices of the Internet of things are often distributed
in different geographical spaces and often unattended, so they are vulnerable to
direct physical attacks and different types of cyber attacks [2]. If an attacker can
control some sensing devices in the Internet of things, he can use these devices
to launch large-scale network attacks (such as DDoS attacks) and then paralyze
the entire Internet of things system [2][3]. (3) Large amount of personal privacy
information, such as physiological information, location information, video and
audio information, will be generated by the user’s body area sensing devices
or portable mobile terminals [4]. These privacy information is often stored in
the device services closely related to the sensing device. If the edge domain de-
ployed these device services lacks effective security protection mechanism, these
privacy information might be illegally accessed or utilized by malicious users,
which might cause a potential huge threat to the personal security of users [5].
In addition to the above three-aspect security threats, the edge domain of the
Internet of things also faces other types of security threats, such as the lack
of security policy caused by virtual machine (VM) migration or data leakage
caused by container technology [1][5].
. In order to effectively enforce the security of the Internet of things, we pro-
pose a SOM-based DDoS defense mechanism using software-defined networking
(SDN)[6]. The main idea of the mechanism is that the security gateway moni-
tors all the sensing devices that access the edge domain, and then analyzes the
access behavior of the source devices by using SOM neural network classifica-
tion algorithm. If it is found that the access behavior of a device constitutes a
DDoS attack, the security gateway will add the MAC address of the device to
the device blacklist and automatically block it in the future. In this case, the
security gateway can automatically identify such attacks whether the attacker
leverages untrusted devices or trusted devices, and then effectively enhance the
security of the entire Internet of things.
. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 is a brief in-
troduction of self-organized maps (SOM). Section 3 is the main body of this
paper, which presents the mechanism in detail. Section 4 implements the mech-
anism and evaluates its effectiveness. Section 5 reviews some related works and
compares them with our mechanism. Finally, Section 6 concludes this paper.
2. Self-organized Maps
. Self-organized maps (SOM) is an unsupervised neural network learning method
proposed by Kohonen in 1982 [7]. It imitates the processing method of human
brain neurons to process information, carries out self training, and automatically
clusters the input eigenvectors. The self-organizing mapping network is divided
into two layers, input space and mapping grid, as shown in Figure 2. Each input
neuron in the input space is usually an n-dimensional eigenvector. Each input
neuron has its corresponding mapping neuron in the mapping grid space. Each
mapping neuron has an m-dimensional synaptic weights, and n = m, that is to
say, the weight vector and the input eigenvector must be equal dimensional.
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Figure 1: The self-organized maps.
. The self-organizing mapping network uses the competitive learning method
to train the grid model, and automatically classifies the input eigenvectors by
calculating the similarity between different mapping neurons in the mapping
grid. The whole training steps are as follows:
(1) Initialize the grid. Usually, the eigenvector of the input neuron is taken
as the initial weight vector of the mapped neuron.
(2) Input a neuron I in the input space, its eigenvector is defined as: I(x)=(x1,
x2,...,xn).
(3) In the mapping grid, the mapping neuron of neuron I is defined as:
M=(x1, x2,...,xn), then calculate the Euclidean distance or other distance be-
tween neuron M and other neurons in the mapping grid. If the weight vector of
the mapped neuron equals W=(w1, w2,...,wn), the distance between the mapped
neuron and neuron M is calculated as follows:
d =
n∑
i=1
||xi − wi|| (1)
(4) After the calculation, select the mapping neuron K with the minimum
distance from neuron M as the winner neuron, that is:
dk = min(
n∑
i=1
||xi − wi||) (2)
(5) If the weight vector of the winning neuronK equalsWk=(wk1, wk2,...,wkn),
then use the value of Wk to adjust the weight vector of other mapping neurons
J , and the calculation method is as follows:
wji(t+ 1) = wji(t) + η · θ(J,K) · (xi(t)− wki(t)) (3)
3
. Where t represents the current time, 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 represents an error coeffi-
cient, and θ(J,K) is a neighborhood function, representing the relative position
relationship between neuron J and the winner neuron K.
(6) Repeat the step (2) to (5) until the weight vector of all mapped neurons
no longer changes significantly, and output the final classification result.
3. SOM-based DDoS defense mechanism
. In order to use SOM neural network for feature classification, we regard the
MAC address of each device in the Internet of things as an input neuron I(x).
When the device accesses the Internet of things, the OVS will send the packet-in
event of the device to the SDN controller for processing. After the controller
receives the event, the feature extraction module in the controller will auto-
matically extract the network features set related to the device from the event
as the feature vector (x1, x2, ..., xn) of the input neuron I(x). At present, we
only consider two characteristic values related to DDoS attacks, namely packet
growth rate (X1) and packet total number (X2) in window time.
1) The calculation method of packet growth rate (X1) in window time is as
follows:
X1 =
P (ti +4t)− P (ti)
4t (4)
Where: 4t is the window time, P (ti) indicates the number of received pack-
ets sent from a device at ti time. The meaning of X1 is that when a device
launches a DDoS attack on the Internet of things, compared with other normal
devices in a fixed window time, the packet growth rate of the device will increase
abnormally and rapidly. Therefore, X1 is a very important characteristic value
for us to identify DDoS attacks.
2) The calculation method of the total number of packages X2 is as folows:
X2 =
n∑
i=0
P (4ti) (5)
Where: P (4ti) indicates the total number of received packets sent from
a device in the nth window time. The meaning of X2 is that when a device
launches a DDoS attack on the Internet of things, the total number of pack-
ets sent from the device will increase abnormally compared with other normal
devices.
. Next, the SOM neutral network algorithm will automatically read the set of
eigenvalues {X1, X2} of all access devices in every window time (4t), and then
classify and calculate these eigenvalues. In this way, the MAC address of each
device corresponds to an input neuron I(xi), which is expressed as: I(xi)={xi1,
xi2} in the input space. Accordingly, the mapping neuron M in the mapping
grid can be expressed as: M(xi)={xi1, xi2}. According to the calculation
(1) and (2), SOM algorithm can find a winner neuron K(xi) with the highest
similarity with the mapping neuron M(xi), and then use the calculation (3)
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to update other mapping neurons in the mapping grid to the winner neuron
along the gradient direction. In this way, after N times of iterative calculation,
SOM neural network algorithm can divide all input neurons into m groups
with similar patterns, so we only need to select the group with the largest
eigenvalue X2 as the DDoS suspicious group. Since each input neuron I(xi)
in our mechanism corresponds to a unique MAC address of the device, the
selected suspicious packet can be transformed into a set D={mac1, mac2,...,
macn}. Finally, according to the set D, the flow table operation module will
send block rules to the OVS so that any suspicious device in set D will be
automatically blocked by OVS in the future, thus the mechanism can effectively
defend against the DDoS attacks launched by sensing layer.
4. Implementation and Evaluations
. The purpose of this experiment is to verify and evaluate: (1) whether the de-
fense mechanism proposed in this paper can effectively detect DDoS attack. (2)
After successfully detecting the DDoS attack, whether the defense mechanism
proposed in this paper can make effective dynamic defense, and then enhance
the security of the system.
. First, we validate whether the defense mechanism can effectively detect DDoS
attack sources. Here we use the Pingflood instruction in Mininet to simulate
the DDoS attacks, i.e., hacker attacks VM3 and physican2 attacks VM2. At 85
seconds after launching the attacks, we start SOM-based DDoS defense mecha-
nism, and then get the real-time monitoring results of the mechanism. Accord-
ing to the evaluation method proposed in reference [Braga], we evaluate the
effectiveness of the mechanism. The specific calculation method is as follows:
DR =
TP
TP + FN
(6)
Where: DR (detection rate) indicates the accuracy of detection, TP (true
positives) indicates the number of correctly identified malicious attack sources,
and FN (false negatives) indicates the number of improperly identified malicious
attack sources.
FA =
FP
FP + TN
(7)
Where: FA (false alarm) indicates the false alarm rate, FP (false posi-
tives) indicates the number of legitimate sources that are misreported as attack
sources, and TN (true negatives) indicates the number of recognized legitimate
sources.
. After multi-round iterations, the defense mechanism has successfully detected
16 source devices in the virtual network, and the number of malicious source
devices identified to launch DDoS attacks in the 16 source devices is 2 (TP=2),
that is, hacker and physician2. The number of malicious attack sources that
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are not correctly identified is 0 (FN=0), the number of legitimate sources that
are misreported is 0 (FP=0), the number of legitimate source devices that
are detected is 14 (TN=14), the detection accuracy of the mechanism is 100%
(DR=100), and the misinformation rate is 0% (FA=0). Therefore, the exper-
imental results show that our defense mechanism can effectively detect DDoS
attack sources.
. After that, we further validate whether the mechanism can make effective
dynamic defense after detecting DDoS attack sources. Here we use Perfmon
performance monitoring toolkit to record the network load and CPU load of
SDN controller in real time. If the network load and CPU load of SDN con-
troller are significantly reduced after the defense mechanism is started, it means
that the mechanism can effectively defend against attacks initiated by DDoS at-
tack sources, otherwise, it means that the mechanism can only effectively detect
DDoS attacks, but there is no way to effectively defend against such attacks.
Figure 6 shows the real-time performance data of SDN controller recorded by
Perfmon in the whole experiment process. The red solid line in the figure rep-
resents the network load data of SDN controller, the blue solid line represents
the CPU workload of SDN controller, the black dotted line represents the time
when DDoS attack starts, and the black solid line represents the time when
SOM-based DDoS defense mechanism starts. It can be seen from the figure
that in the 120th second of the experiment, we use the hacker and physician2
devices in the virtual network to launch a simulated DDoS attack on the net-
work. This kind of network attack causes a great network load to the SDN
controller, that is, the red curve rises rapidly after 120s, and it always fluctu-
ates in the high position. In the 205th second of the experiment, we started
the attack defense mechanism. We found that after the defense mechanism was
started, the CPU workload (blue line) of the SDN controller fluctuated inter-
mittently and rose, while the network workload (red line) dropped rapidly and
returned to normal quickly in the 210th second of the experiment. Here, the
CPU workload fluctuates intermittently because our defense mechanism is pre-
set to execute intermittently according to a fixed window time (4t). Therefore,
the CPU workload of the controller also fluctuates intermittently. The rapid
decline of network load fully shows that the defense mechanism has successfully
detected the DDoS attack sources, and made effective dynamic defense for these
two DDoS attack sources, that is, a large number of packets sent from the attack
sources have been directly blocked by the underlying OVS, and will not be for-
warded to the SDN controller for analysis and processing, so that the network
load of the SDN controller appears a rapid decrease. In conclusion, the experi-
mental results in Figure 5 show that the DDoS defense mechanism proposed in
this paper can effectively detect the DDoS attack sources, and can implement
effective dynamic defense after successfully detecting the attack sources so that
enhance the security of the Internet of things.
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Figure 2: The performance monitoring of SDN controller.
5. Related Work
. In this section, we discuss some research works concerning how to implement
security enforcement mechanisms using software-defined networking, and com-
pare these proposals with our framework.
. Hu et al. [8] proposed a comprehensive framework, Flowguard, to facilitate
accurate detection as well as flexible resolution of firewall policy violations in
dynamic OpenFlow networks. In addition, authors implemented a prototype
using Floodlight. The experimental results show that Flowguard has the man-
ageable performance overhead to enable realtime monitoring network. Similarly,
Porras et al. [9] proposed a security enforcement controller, FortNOX, which
is an extension on NOX controller. FortNOX is designed to enable a network
flow to be blocked (or allowed) by security applications. They also proposed
a conflict resolving mechanism used in case of appearing policy conflicts. Ex-
actly, we are inspired by the ideas of Flowguard and FortNOX in some sense, we
also design the relevant policy resolving mechanism in our framework, i.e., the
information flow rules of administrator (Role = A) can override those rules of
users (Role = U). Moreover, we design all entries in OVS can be automatically
updated per t minutes, which can also be used to resolve the policy conflicts.
. Suh et al. [10] leveraged POX controller to implement a firewall application.
Each firewall rule can be defined by 6 actions and 12 conditions, and the final
experimental results illustrate the firewall is effective. But this mechanism re-
quires network operators to know the details of underlying network, and input
the firewall rules into the controller manually. While in our framework, all of
information flow rules of IFM are converted from SRM automatically, service
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providers just need to know which service could be released to which consumer
or which thing, other details of underlying network can be created from system
models automatically. Therefore, any normal user can leverage our framework
to rapidly define their security policies.
. Koerner et al. [11] proposed a MAC-based VLAN tagging mechanism using
SDN. The virtual local area network (VLAN) has been widely used in enterprise
networks where the security policy is always defined by VLAN address. But
some mobile laptop-based workstations often change their locations, which will
leads to the frequent changing of its VLAN address and incur security policy
conflicts. To address this problem, authors leverage Floodlight controller to map
the MAC address of laptop into its corresponding VLAN address in network.
Since MAC address is static, thus it can guarantees the laptops can access the
network successfully in different locations. In our framework, the controller use
information flow rule to recognize an authorized user, i.e., the pair 〈 Src, Dst
〉. Here Src is MAC address of service consumer, Dst is VLAN address of VM,
but we don’t need to convert MAC address into a VLAN address.
. In addition, Javid et al. [12] implemented a 2-layer firewall using POX con-
troller. CloudWatcher [13] is a security monitoring framework by which network
operators can define a policy to describe a network traffic and describe which
security services must be applied to it. Koorevaar et al. [14] proposed an
framework for leveraging SDN for automatic security policy enforcement using
EEL-tags. These tags are added into the VM’s flow by hypervisor. By means
of these added EEL tags, they can implement the associated security policy.
However, this work heavily relies on trustful hypervisor, thus the portability of
method is a big problem need to be considered.
6. Conclusion
. In order to effectively address the security threats of the Internet of things,
we propose a SOM-based DDoS defense mechanism using SDN in this paper.
To validate the feasibility of the mechanism proposed in this paper, we use
POX controller and Mininet emulator to implement an experimental system.
We evaluate the SOM-based DDoS defense mechanism. The final experimental
results show that the mechanism can effectively detect the DDoS attack sources,
and can implement effective dynamic defense after successfully detecting the
attack sources, so that it can effectively enhance the security of the Internet of
things. However, there exists some limitations in current research work. Because
Mininet is difficult to deploy more complex DDoS attack testing toolkits, thus
we can only use Ping flood instruction to simulate real DDoS attacks towards
the Internet of things. In the future, we intend to deploy the framework in a
real network environment, and get more accurate evaluation results.
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